

TAB

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

For use of this form, see AR 190-8; the proponent agency is DCSPER.

INTERMENT SERIAL NUMBER

NOT ~~yet~~ assigned

FROM:

TF 20 Forward Operating Base (H1 Walled Pumping Station and Airfield), Iraq
*Prepared under provision of AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War..., para 3-10

TO:

THRU Operation Iraqi Freedom Theater EPW Cage, Umm
Qasr

(Army) Branch Prisoner of War Identification Center

FOR National Prisoner of War Identification Center

NAME (Last, first, MI) Mr ^{Mr} Mahmud, Tarik S (presumed)		GRADE	SERVICE NUMBER
		Unknown	Unknown
NATIONALITY	POWER SERVED	PLACE OF CAPTURE/INTERMENT AND DATE	
Iraqi (presumed)	Unknown	Iraq, H1 Walled Pumping Station / Airfield	
PLACE OF BIRTH		DATE OF BIRTH	
Baghdad (presumed)		1966 (presumed) ^{at} ⁱⁿ	
NAME, ADDRESS, AND RELATIONSHIP OF NEXT OF KIN		FIRST NAME OF FATHER	
Unknown		Unknown	
PLACE OF DEATH	DATE OF DEATH	CAUSE OF DEATH	
H1 Airfield flight line	11 April 2003	Unknown	
PLACE OF BURIAL	DATE OF BURIAL		
vicinity H1 walled pumping station, Iraq: 700m out front gate to first culvert, 191 degrees for 50m	12 April 2003		
IDENTIFICATION OF GRAVE			
stacked stones (See attached DA form 2823) Next to grave with stacked stones in same location			
PERSONAL EFFECTS (To be filled in by Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel)			

— RETAINED BY DETAINING POWER

✓ FORWARDED WITH DEATH
CERTIFICATE TO (Specify)— FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO
(Specify)BRIEF DETAILS OF DEATH/BURIAL BY PERSON WHO CARED FOR THE DECEASED DURING ILLNESS OR DURING LAST MOMENTS
(Doctor, Nurse, Minister of Religion, Fellow Internee). IF CREMATED, GIVE REASON. (If more space is required, continue on reverse side).

Arrived by Humvee, was altered by Driver that he had possible DOA. Was immediately examined by the undersigned and found to have no pulse (carotid or radial-bilateral) no breath on auscultation or breath on exam, non reactive pupils (II), cyanosis in nail beds. Pronounced death seen a few minutes later by Dr. Uenzel and he agreed with death pronounced.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE
CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY

DATE

11 April 03

SIGNATURE OF MEDICAL OFFICER

CPT, MC, FS
TF Sennale Sur

SIGNATURE OF CORPSE IDENTIFIER

WITNESSES

SIGNATURE

ADDRESS

96th CAB
Fl. Brass, NC 28314

SIGNATURE

ADDRESS

H1/HIS/Ops

12 Apr 03

ENCLOSURE 2 TO
PSS/13/34/5/CI/AIR
DATED 7 SEP 04

XXXXXXXXXX

Copy to:

II Sqn RAF Regt - 2IC

EPW INCIDENT ARF - FRI 11 APR 03

1. Thank you for taking the time to talk to me on this PM and alleviate my fears that resulted from the apparent 'Salami Slicing' of information you required. You are now aware that I would not wish, as discussed, for this document to be used as a legal statement. If formal Statements are required I would wish, as a prudent precaution, to have a legal representation present with my men. Therefore, as discussed, I would appreciate it if you would refrain from forwarding this document to higher formations without that understanding. I also feel an overview of the ARF SOP for EPW handling would be worthwhile at this point:

a. The CH47 (Heli 2) concerned has 14 pax from the ARF:

- 1 x chalk commander / positioned outside a/c in overall control
- 2 x pax at front of a/c as internal over watch
- 1 x tie and bag man (linkman) positioned as ho/to man between the two forces
- 10 x pax in pairs for reception and processing of EPW onto a/c (the second pair on board included the chalk 2 i/c who once on board would control the ac if chalk commander not available) one man to handle and one man to cover:

— EPW handled from the rear one hand on collar and one hand on the small of back.

— EPW cover from one metre to the left/right and be prepared to handle if EPW became difficult.

- In a/c EPW handled to the floor by applying pressure and weight. Handler then knelt beside / on top of the EPW, cover man remaining standing until required. All EPW placed nose to tail with one man kneeling next to him and one standing and covering. However, due to increased number of EPW the ARF/EPW ratios were slightly reduced.

2. Overview

a. For the first transit Heli 1 (chalk commander Plt Off [REDACTED] accompanied by OC ARF, the LO was due to take 7 EPW's and Heli 2 (chalk commander Sgt [REDACTED] was due to take 8 EPW's. Due to [REDACTED] taking 2 EPW's to the wrong ac, Heli 1 eventually took 5 EPW's and Heli 2 took 10 EPW's. On arrival at the pick up all the ARF were concerned by the poor preparation of the EPW's who were poorly cuffed (by the thumbs only with small tie wraps to the front of their bodies) and bagged (none of the EPW's had bags on their heads, this remained the case for transit 2 and 3 despite sufficient bags and cuffs being left for [REDACTED] by the ARF). [REDACTED] appeared to unnecessarily rush the EPW's onto the ac which culminated with 2 EPW's being placed,

unaccompanied by the ARF, onto the wrong ac. It was to one of these two EPWs that the incident concerns. A detailed chronological description is outlined below. The whole evolution is set against a time pressure environment induced by the increased number of EPW (40-50 EPWs initially briefed, actually 63 EPWs were taken), ac refuelling requirement and light levels.

b. Sequence of events 11 APR 03 at the PUP:

(1) At the PUP each EPW was accompanied by 2 ARF personnel. They were plasticcuffed to the front of the body by [REDACTED] and hooded by sandbags by the ARF. 2 ARF personnel escorted each EPW to the CH47s. During the loading procedure, each EPW was forced to the floor face down into a posture that allowed positive control by ARF control. 10 EPW were loaded onto Heli 2. The last two EPW were loaded onto Heli 2 by [REDACTED] personnel, unsighted by LO and Heli 2 Chalk Comd. The second to last EPW refused to adopt the required position despite two ARF personnel attempting to control him. The linkman observed the situation and took control of the EPW. He was forced to the floor of the ac. A member of the ARF was then instructed to kneel on the subject EPWs' back to subdue him. The ARF then attempted to move all EPWs' forward to facilitate the closing of the ac ramp as directed by the Air Load Master. At this time, the subject EPW became violent and as he was moved freed himself from the plasticcuffs and stood up, flailing his arms, striking out at ARF personnel and attempting to move forward in the ac. Seeing this development the linkman swept the subject EPWs' legs away with his own foot, holding the EPW and lowered him to the floor. He then knelt on the subject EPWs' back and re-cuffed him. He also ensured the hood was secure. This subdued the subject EPW and a ARF member was detailed to stand guard, kneeling on the subjects EPWs' back. The ac then lifted and all EPWs' were acting in the correct manner. Each EPW was assured throughout the flight by gently patting them on the head and shoulder with accordance with ARF orders. After an unspecified time, the linkman observed a large wet patch, which he assumed to be urine around the subject EPW. The linkman was initially concerned and shook the EPW by the leg, telling his guard to monitor him.

(2) At this time, there was some commotion at the front of the ac due to one of the EPWs' losing his artificial legs. This then drew the attention of the linkman away from the subject EPW. On refocusing on the subject EPW the linkman was content that he was passive and compliant. The aircraft then arrived at H1, and all Heli 2 EPWs remained on the ac until ordered to move by the ARF commander.

(3) On arrival at H1 Heli 2 Chalk Comd immediately left the ac to speak with ARF Comd. The Linkman was left at the ac and posted himself at the ramp. He was in this position when the ARF Comd and Sigs arrived at heli 2 with the Chalk Comd. The linkman was then despatched to the rear of the ac by the Chalk Comd to receive the EPWs. EPW No 1 (nearest the ramp) was moved off the ac by 2 x ARF pers. EPWs 2 (subject EPW) and 3 were not compliant and the Chalk Comd made the decision to leave them on the ac under guard and move the remaining EPWs off. This was completed and then an ARF escort party ordered to move EPWs 2 & 3 off the ac. These men were found to be unresponsive and at this point the Chalk Comd became concerned about the health of EPWs 2 & 3. The Chalk Comd of Heli 2 then informed the Chalk Comd of Heli 1 and the ARF Comd that he suspected that EPWs 2 & 3 were unconscious and may have potentially suffered a heart attack. The Chalk Comd of Heli 2 requested MT CASEVAC from the [REDACTED]

RESTRICTED

through Heli 1 Chalk Comd and also informed him and the LO of the Limbless EPW. Heli 1 Chalk Comd tasked the [REDACTED] to provide MT for the CASEVAC and this was repeated by the LO. The [REDACTED] arrived and was directed to Heli 2 to collect EPW 2 & 3. The ARF Personnel guarding EPW 2 & 3 placed them on the [REDACTED] as directed by the [REDACTED] and those ARF personnel on Heli 2 quickly reboarded in order to complete the mission. The EPW HO/TO process was then completed by the LO to the satisfaction of the [REDACTED]. All remaining ARF Pers then reboarded Heli 1 and the 2 CH47 moved to another location.

3. Wrt your points on medical care you will be aware that all members of the MSU have been tasked to another unit & W Coy as part of their enduring op. This left the ARF with no specialist intrinsic medical cover other than that available at the H1 FST.

4. Finally to put this all in to context the EF para given by the LO highlighted that these EPW were potential members of AQ, Fedadyeen and suicide bombers. Detailed orders and rehearsals were conducted by Plt Off [REDACTED] who emphasised the use of minimum force and appropriate behaviour when handling EPWs.

[REDACTED]
Sqn Ldr
OC II Sqn RAF Regt